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THE SCARRING EFFECT OF UNEMPLOYMENT IN TEN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES : AN 
ANALYSIS BASED ON THE ECHP  
 
 







This paper investigates the effect of unemployment on earnings for ten European countries. Using 
an harmonised database (ECHP), we estimate the impact of declared unemployment on individuals 
while  taking  account  of  attrition  and  unobserved  individual  heterogeneity.  We  find  that  the 
unemployment effect differs by country and gender. The wage penalty is greater for men than for 
women. It is also higher in the more flexible economies. We suggest that labour market institutions 
such as unemployment benefits and wage-setting institutions may be avenues of investigation to 
explain these differences. 
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Unemployment leaves its mark on people. One of the earliest surveys in Austria in the 1930s 
showed  that  the  unemployed  in  a  village  hit  by  a  factory  closure  suffered  from  apathy  and  a 
weakening of social ties (Lazarsfeld, 1932). More recent studies have confirmed this observation 
and point out that unemployment affects both the well-being and the health of those who undergo it 
(Clark, 2008; Bell and Blanchflower, 2009; Mesrine 2000). In addition to, or associated with, these 
psychological and social effects, it appears that a period of unemployment also affects individuals’ 
economic  potential.  It  leads  to  a  loss  of  income  at  the  time  and  increases  the  likelihood  of 
experiencing a further period of unemployment or lower wages. When an employee returns to work, 
they may have a lower income than someone whose career has not been interrupted. 
Economic  theory  offers  a  number  of  ways  of  explaining  the  salary  penalty  due  to 
unemployment. In terms of human capital theory (Becker, 1962 and 1975), unemployment may be 
seen as the breakdown of an employment relationship for which the worker had developed skills 
and specific human capital. In this case, on taking another job, they will no longer be able to return 
to their earlier productivity and their earnings may be reduced. According to Spence (1973), the 
employer, with imperfect information, attempts to infer a person’s productivity from information 
such as their educational qualifications. Extending this analysis, one may suppose that a period of 
unemployment may also be perceived as a negative signal of the unemployed person’s abilities and 
lead  the  employer  to  reduce  the  wages  offered.  There  is  apparently  a  stigma  related  to 
unemployment.  The  search  and  matching  theory  (Mortensen,  1986)  provides  more  nuanced 
conclusions  whereby  the  impact  of  unemployment  depends  on  the  quality  of  the  previous  job 
match. A period of unemployment that destroys a “successful” match may lower the future earnings 
of the unemployed person if they find a job in which they are less efficient. Conversely, the break 
may be beneficial if it enables them to find a better match and therefore be more productive.  The 
impact of unemployment on wages is consequently an empirical question and is likely to vary from 
one country to another as a function of the institutions of the labour market. 
Researchers  in  the  United  States  were  among  the  first  to  examine  the  consequences  of 
unemployment on individuals. During the industrial restructuring of the 1980s, they focused on 
“displaced workers
1” with some years of seniority who lost their jobs as a result of factory closure 
                                                 
1 The definition of the US Bureau of Labor Statistics is as follows: “persons 20 years of age and older who lost or left 
jobs because their plant or company closed or moved, there was insufficient work for them to do, or their position or 
shift was abolished.” Jacobson, Lallonde and Sullivan (1993) examined workers who had worked for at least six years 
with the same company before losing their jobs.   3
or downsizing. Studies based on a survey
2 monitoring these workers (Topel, 1990; Farber, 1993 and 
1997; Neal, 1995) found a negative effect of unemployment on new hire wages by comparing 
wages before and after the period of unemployment. However, the extent of wage loss may be 
underestimated,  since  continuously  employed  workers  had  rising  wages  during  that  period. 
Moreover, the wages of people who were later laid off were already lower than those of people 
whose employment was not interrupted (Jacobson et al., 1993). For these various reasons, and to 
compare  these  workers  with  those  continuously  employed,  studies  using  longitudinal  databases 
(Ruhm,  1991;  Stevens,  1997)  and  administrative  data  (Jacobsen  et  al.,  1993  and  2005)  added 
greater detail to the analysis. They note persistent negative effects of unemployment on re-hire 
wages.  Six  years  after  the  job  loss,  Jacobson  et  al.  (1993)  find  a  wage  penalty  of  25%  for 
unemployed  workers  in  Pennsylvania.  This  loss,  much  higher  than  that  found  in  other  articles 
(roughly 10%-15%) may be due to the poor state of the economy at that time (Couch and Placzek, 
2010). The negative effect of unemployment would thus be explained by a loss of human capital, 
particularly firm-specific human capital, because these studies focus on workers with some job 
seniority made redundant. In support of this thesis, Carrington (1993) notes that the penalty is 
higher when workers change industry. 
The literature on Europe is much less extensive. Allowing for unobserved heterogeneity and 
selection bias, two articles on British male workers (Arulampalam, 2001; Gregory and Jukes, 2001) 
calculate an unemployment-related penalty of 6% and 10% respectively. Arulampalam adds that 
unemployment lowers expected wages even more. The existence of a wage penalty is confirmed for 
the UK economy, taking into account all unemployment periods and not simply those workers made 
redundant. On the other hand, an analysis of “displaced” full-time male workers in Germany (Burda 
and Mertens, 2001) observes a low unemployment wage penalty on re-hire (3.6%). Indeed the 
effect is a positive one for bottom quartile workers, those most likely to be affected by job losses 
due to industrial restructuring. This finding confirms those of early studies showing a small effect of 
unemployment on displaced workers in continental European countries (Kuhn, 2002; Leonard and 
Van  Audenrode,  1995;  Ackum,  1991).  Kuhn  (2002)  attributed  this  to  income  support  for  the 
unemployed and wage-setting institutions in these countries. Since the European literature is less 
extensive and uses more diverse methods and databases, the question of an unemployment-related 
wage penalty remains open. 
                                                 
2 The Displaced Worker Supplement” (DWS), an additional part of the Current Population Survey (CPS), was carried 
out for the first time in 1984. It covered workers with some seniority who had lost their jobs because of restructuring. 
The survey was then repeated every four years.   4
This article uses a common database (European Community Household Panel) to examine 
whether there is an unemployment-related wage handicap in Europe and whether the effect of this 
handicap  on  the  wage  prospects  of  individuals  varies  from  one  legislative  and  institutional 
environment to another. The article differs from the existing literature on a number of points. It 
examines the impact of unemployment stated by individuals, whatever the cause of their job loss. 
This may be justified since the borderline between economic inactivity and unemployment under 
the ILO definition may be blurred and the real motive for lay-offs may be masked or negotiated 
because of unemployment benefit laws. Like other articles, this one allows in its estimates for 
unobserved heterogeneity and selection bias. However, the Wooldridge method is used to correct 
for  panel  attrition  and  selection  by  introducing  a  selection  equation  each  year
3.  Our  analysis 
specifically introduces a gender dimension by estimating separate equations for men and women to 
see if the wage penalty of unemployment operates differently by gender in Europe. In the United 
States, men and women alike suffer a similar penalty. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 1 describes the data set and Section 2 explains the 
methodology. Results are discussed in Section 3 and analysed with respect to the labour market 
framework of each country. 
 
I. Description of database
Data and sample. 
The  data  used  in  our  analysis  come  from  the  eight  waves  of  the  European  Community 
Household Panel, surveyed annually from 1994 to 2001. Data from these waves were collected on 
the activity and income of individuals monitored in the ten countries selected for this analysis 
(Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom). 
Two of the countries in the panel in 1994 were removed
4 because variables of crucial importance 
for our study are not recorded. 
Our variables are based on a calendar recording respondents’ activity  month  by  month. 
During the survey, they were asked to state their main activity for each month of the previous year, 
whether employment, training or unemployment. An individual is considered as “unemployed” if 
they report unemployment at some point in a month. This declaration option seems to us preferable 
                                                 
3 The article by Arranz et al. (2005) on the European Community Household Panel is restricted to people present 
throughout the duration of the panel and introduces a selection equation for their presence in the first year. 
4 Since Austria and Finland did not participate in every wave, we do not examine them in our study. The Netherlands 
and Luxembourg are not included either, the former because the activity calendar variables are not recorded, and the 
latter because of the small sample and the small number of unemployed in this country. Sweden did not participate in 
the panel.   5
to the ILO’s standard option because it does not omit the situation of the discouraged unemployed. 
It enables us to understand more broadly the experience of people deprived of employment
5. 
Like Jacobson et al. (1993), we examine in this paper the consequences of unemployment 
on monthly wages, which include the effect of hourly wage and number of hours worked
6. Our 
variable is constructed by dividing the annual income for a given year by the number of months 
stated to have been worked that year. 
For the ten countries, we use the information available from all eight waves. And since the 
information on the calendar of activity and income is given for year t+1 for the individual present in 
year t, we have 722,946 observations from 1994 to 2000. Taking only those under 65 who are not 
students and have a complete calendar of activity, there remain about 543,852 observations. Of 
these respondents remaining, 37,000 had a period of unemployment between 1994 and 2000. Their 
characteristics in 1995 are given below (Table 1.1). 
 Table 1.1 here 
Construction of explanatory variables  
In order to identify the effect of unemployment by country and gender, wage estimates are made 
by  country  and  gender.  The  first  explanatory  variables  are  the  standard  socio-demographic 
characteristics  (Mincer,  1962),  such  as  educational  qualifications,  cohort  and  cohort-square, 
experience  and  experience-square,  time  worked  (part-time  or  otherwise)  and  sector  of  activity 
(public or private). For a closer analysis of the impact of unemployment on wages, we add detail to 
this  variable  by  distinguishing  between  various  components:  “non-experience”,  duration  effect, 
long-term and recurrent unemployment effect. 
! “Non-experience”: a period of unemployment is first a lack of occupational experience 
compared with the employed. The first effect of unemployment is the loss of experience it 
causes.  Cumulative  experience  during  the  panel  period  is  constructed  from  the  activity 
calendar for each month in the year and supplemented by the number of years’ potential 
experience from age at first job until first appearance in the panel. We then calculate for 
                                                 
5 This approach is not totally without bias either, since people find it easier to say they were unemployed in countries 
with a significant support system. 
6 Concentrating on the calendar of activity to identify people who had been unemployed did not make it possible to 
carry out an analysis of hourly wages. We are consequently analysing the consequences of unemployment in the “broad 
sense”.   6
each year the average variable for the months worked since this will determine the average 
wage for the year
7; 
! Duration  of  unemployment:  we  also  identify  a  further  stigma  due  to  unemployment  by 
calculating the impact on potential wages of the past duration of unemployment. The loss of 
skills  and  wage  prospects  are  likely  to  depend  on  both  the  fact  and  duration  of 
unemployment. Here we seek to identify the influence of short-term unemployment, under 
one year
8. The activity calendar is used to construct this variable, by re-initialising it when 
the respondent has worked for a full year
9; 
! Long-term  unemployment:  the  calendar  can  also  be  used  to  see  whether  the  people 
monitored  had  a  period  of  long-term  unemployment  during  the  panel  period.  This 
information, supplemented by a question about long-term unemployment before appearing 
in the panel, gives us an indicative variable; 
! Recurrent unemployment: for a given total duration, recurrent unemployment is recorded to 
distinguish between the influence of repeated periods and a long period of unemployment. 
We also calculate this from the activity calendar and a variable for unemployment and the 
number of periods of unemployment before the panel period. 
Since the ECHP is an unbalanced panel, the main problem with the data is attrition and missing 
values in an incomplete calendar for some 10% of respondents (table in Appendix 1). There are 
gaps  that  prevent  us  from  accurately  calculating  experience  and  duration  of  last  period  of 
unemployment for all periods following the gap. We decided to estimate activity for each month in 
the gap from the average state observed during the 12 months before and after the gap. 
 
II. Estimation method
There are two important related econometric issues that need to be dealt with in this type of 
analysis. The first is to do with unobserved heterogeneity. 
                                                 
7 To allow for measurement errors, experience needs to be estimated over the entire sample—with or without mention 
of wages—from all the variables at each date (Dustman and Rocchina-Barrachina, 2007). 
8 Our estimates show that there was no particular influence of duration of unemployment in excess of one year. 
9 As in the case of experience, we calculate the average value for the year. We also calculate the values of these 
variables for the first month worked in the year. We assume that someone whose duration of unemployment in the first 
month is higher than the average for the year keeps the handicap recorded in January for the entire year. The duration of 
unemployment used is therefore average value or value at 1 January, whichever is the higher. For example, for someone 
unemployed from September to December in year n and employed all year n+1, this value will be 4 months, or 
2/3 of a 
half-year. For someone who had another 8-month period in from April to November of year n+1, the value will be 
(4x3+8x1)/4=5 months, which will be divided into the average monthly wage calculated from the 4 months worked in 
year n+1.   7
Unobserved individual heterogeneity: the future low earnings of the unemployed might also reflect 
their unobserved characteristics. The unemployed might, on average, have fewer social networks, 
have more difficult labour market conditions, be less productive types than the employed, or have a 
greater preference for leisure. These unobserved individual characteristics would then explain both 
the labour market situation and the salary earned.  
Moreover, in the standard human capital model, returns to tenure and experience are interpreted as 
returns to specific and general human capital, respectively. But, as we have seen above, according 
to search models, a match between a firm and an individual will last longer if it is a “good” match, 
and more experienced workers would have had more time to find a good match. As a result, tenure 
and  experience  variables  will  be  correlated  with  unobservable  job-specific  or  match-specific 
variables and may lead to biased results that cast doubt on cross-section results (Chamberlain, 1982; 
Moulton, 1986). The possible correlation between the unobservables and the observables needs to 
be accounted for in the estimation of the parameters of interest. This will be done through two 
methods. 
The panel data can be used to identify the correlation between the explanatory variables and 
the individual heterogeneity parameters by introducing individual fixed effects corresponding to the 
average  values  of  the  variables  over  the  observation  period  (Mundlak,  1978).  This  is  the 
generalisation of the “difference-in-difference” estimation that will enable us to recover the effect 
of an interruption by removing the common macro effects as well as the unobservable individual 
specific effects. We need also to allow for the effects of two further sources of bias. First, this 
procedure does not account for unobserved heterogeneity resulting from the quality of the match in 
the respondent’s current job and therefore time varying for each individual. And we must take into 
account the non-random selection of the sample. 
Attrition bias: a simple regression of individual salaries on the explanatory variables would produce 
biased  estimated  coefficients.  By  construction,  we  only  observe  earnings  for  individuals  in 
employment who answered the questionnaire. The sample is thus selected by the labour market 
status and presence in the panel sample in the year in question. However, these are criteria which 
result from individual choice, decision to work, stay in the country, not move and stop answering 
the questionnaire and so on, and are correlated with the specific unobserved heterogeneity. They 
will likely depend on education, family structure and with respect to labour force participation, 
expected labour market earnings. The standard technique employed in these circumstances involves 
two steps (Heckman, 1979). First, a model to explain the probability of an individual being in the 
selected sample used in the estimation of the wages equation is estimated using a reduced form   8
probit. Among the set of variables entering the selection equation, one also requires variables that 
influence the probability of being in the sample but not the observed wages conditional on being in 
the sample. In our case the explanatory variables for the presence in the sample are education, and 
education-square, age and age-square, number of children aged 0-2, number of children aged 3-5, 
number of children under 15, presence of a spouse, their activity and wage, having 3 children or 
more, having worked in the public sector during the panel period, being a wife, a child living in 
their parent’s home, living in an extended family. Second, a correction term is constructed using the 
generalised residuals (inverse Mills ratio) and used as an additional regressor in the wage equation 
to correct for the selection. The process is identified by exclusion variables – family and spouse 
situations - that explain the selection and do not explain the wages.  
However, this procedure cannot be used to vary the effect of those variables that explain 
selection over time, although unobserved heterogeneity is also linked to the match, current job and 
selection, and also varies over time. Wooldridge proposes a method that consists of studying a 
fixed-effect  model  in  which  individual  specific  effects  may  be  correlated  with  the  explanatory 
variables of both equations in the model: the equation of interest explains wages and the selection 
equation. We use this method with the following explanatory variables for the selection equation. 
In formal terms, the equations of the model are: 
 
       T t N i X W d W it i it it it it ,..., 1 , ,..., 1 , . . ) 1 (
* ! ! " " ! ! # $ %  
      it i it it Z d & ' ( " " ! . ) 2 (
*  
       1 ! it d   if and only if  0
* ) it d  
The logarithm of monthly wages in that year (
*
it W ) is a latent variable only observed if the person is 
working ( 1 ! it d ). In this model, ! and " are the values to be estimated and  it X and  it Z are vectors of 
explanatory variables where some elements, such as education, are common. For each of these equations, the 
global  error  term  is  broken  down  into  a  term  representing  individual  specific  effects  ( i $ and  i ' )  and 
idiosyncratic terms ( it #  and  it & ) which are not necessarily independent of each other.  
As we have mentioned, the individual characteristics may be correlated with the explanatory 
variables. When seeking to estimate !, (1) has to be conditional on the result of the selection 
process equation.    9
However, since this condition may affect the unobserved determinants of wages and cause a selection bias, 
especially when the indicative variable !"# is not independent of individual fixed effects ($") or chance (%"#). 
Namely,  
(3) &'$" ( %"#)*+"#,!"# - ./)0 1 for all t. 
So the conditional expectation of the error term 2"# - $" ( %"#)is not zero. However, if expression (3) were 
known,  it  could  be  added  to  equation  (1)  and  the  parameters  thus  obtained  estimated  convergently  by 
standard estimation methods.  
Using the notation 3"# - 4" ( 5"#, Wooldridge (1995) considers the following alternative: &'2"#)*
)+",6",3"#/ - 7#)3"# ( +"8  where +" and 6" represent vectors of +"# and 6"#. As term 3"#)cannot be observed, 
but only the indicative variable !"# is observed, &'2"#)*)+",6",3"#/ must be replaced by the expectation of 2"# 
where 6" and !"# are known. The result is : 
&'2"#)*)+",6",!"#/ -)7#&'3"#)*)+",6",!"#/)++"8 
In this model, the condition expectation of 3"# is the generalised residual of the selection equation &'3"#)*
)+",6",!"#/ - 9"#  where the 9"#  represent the inverse Mills ratios for each t. Equation (1) is conditioned by 
the selection process and is expressed:  
&':"#)*)+",6",!"#/ -)+"8 ( +"#; ( 7#9"# 
The estimation method is the following : a probit model is estimated for each t to obtain 9"# values, then 
equation (1) is estimated by OLS by adding all the explanatory variables at the various dates and the error 
correction term for each period. The tests then account for correlation structure of the residuals.  
III. Regression results 
The estimations, calculated separately for men and women, are given in Tables 3.1 and 3.2, 
which indicate the values of the coefficients and the significance tests. 
Wage equations: general effects 
Education, experience, part-time work and the sector of activity present values significantly 
different from zero at the 1% threshold in almost all countries. 
The sector of activity is used as a control variable and has a greater effect for women than 
for men. Compared with the private tertiary sector, the public sector and industry pay on average 
wages 10% to 20% higher for women. These effects are smaller in Belgium and non-significant in 
Denmark. For men, working outside the private tertiary sector does not have the same effect in all 
countries.  There  is  a  wage  advantage  to  working  in  the  public  sector  in  Italy,  Portugal  and   10
Germany, whereas it is a wage penalty in Denmark, France, Ireland and the United Kingdom. In 
addition, the bonus related to the industrial sector, where it exists, is lower for men than for women. 
For both sexes, working in the farm sector considerably reduces wages, an effect that is particularly 
marked in Portugal. 
For both men and women, education qualifications have much the same effect throughout 
Europe. Compared with a secondary school leaving certificate, lower qualifications reduce men’s 
average wages by nearly 20% and a higher education qualification increases them by 30%. Since 
the  vast  majority  of  men  work  full  time,  this  is  mainly  an  hourly  wage  effect.  There  are  two 
countries where qualifications have a much greater effect. In France, higher education is “worth” 
nearly 50% more than the next level below, and in Portugal, the wage gap between the highest and 
lowest qualifications is twice that of the country average (+60% for higher education, –40% for no 
secondary school leaving certificate). This may be connected to the relatively low wages of farm 
workers and other unqualified workers in that country. Conversely, the benefit of higher education 
is  lowest  in  the  United  Kingdom  (+20%).  Among  the  less  well  qualified,  those  who  have  no 
secondary school leaving certificate, the French, Danes and British are penalised least. For women, 
the patterns are not as clear as for men. The wage gap for both men and women between the highest 
and lowest qualifications is very marked in the Mediterranean countries, France and particularly 
Portugal. 
In general terms, experience has a significantly positive effect and is particularly rewarded 
in Germany, the United Kingdom and Ireland. For men, this large experience effect goes together 
with a large cohort effect, evidence of advantages acquired during their careers. Elsewhere, the 
experience and cohort effects vary by country and gender. For men, experience has a lower effect in 
southern European countries and France. 
Past  unemployment  and  its  duration  generally  have  a  negative  impact  on  men’s  wages, 
except in Belgium, Denmark and Germany. Perhaps the loss of skills or the stigma attached to 
unemployment  are  less  marked  in  these  countries than  in the others. For  women,  the effect  is 
significant in half the panel countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland and Spain). 
 
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 here 
 
 Impact of unemployment on men’s wages 
We examined various possible effects of unemployment on the wages of people who return 
to work: lack of experience, short periods of unemployment in the past and their duration, long 
periods of unemployment and recurrent unemployment.   11
The graph below summarises these points by simulating the impact on wages of a single 
period of six months’ unemployment. Some of the variables were found to be non-relevant. For 
example,  recurrent  unemployment  was  not  significant  in  many  countries  and  its  effect  is  not 
included  in  the  graph.  Similarly,  the  non-significant  dummy  variable  “had  a  long  period  of 
unemployment” was not included
10 but was integrated in the form of an average across the panel 
period, since it turned out that from the outset of their careers, those who at some point had a year’s 
unemployment have below-average wages. We simulate the effect of six months’ unemployment on 
wages in relative value, using the estimated coefficients for the duration and experience variables, 
which we call the pure effect. The apparent effect includes, in addition to the two previous, the 
impact  of  unobserved  heterogeneity  specific  to  the  individual,  based  on  variable  averages 
(Mundlak, 1978). 
 
Graph  1. The effect of a six months’ period of unemployment on men’s wages 
 
 
In the ten countries under study, unemployment has a negative effect on men’s wages. This 
echoes  the  result  found  in  the  English-speaking  countries.  The  wage  penalty  related  to 
unemployment is confirmed in a panel of European countries even with the broader definition of 
unemployment  we  adopted.  But  the  effect  varies  by  country.  The  United  Kingdom  stands  out 
clearly. The simulation of six months’ unemployment reduces wages by 20%, whereas the effect is 
4% in Belgium, Greece and Spain, and not far from 10% in most other European countries. These 
findings appear to chime with the English-language literature, which points out the relatively large 
effect of unemployment in the most flexible economies. At the other extreme, the effect is lowest in 
Denmark. 
                                                 







pure effect apparent effect  12
Unemployed men in the UK appear to combine various handicaps: having been unemployed 
(–14%) plus a large effect of loss of experience (–6%). This combination of handicaps is also found 
in Ireland, but only to half the extent in the UK (–10%). 
Table 3.3 here 
Among  the  countries  with  a  medium  wage  penalty  (France,  Ireland,  Italy,  Portugal, 
Germany) it is in Germany that the wage penalty is mainly due to the loss of experience, in a 
country that places great importance on this. In the other countries it is the fact of having been 
unemployed that is the main source of the wage penalty. This may be due to a lower consideration 
of general of specific human capital or a stigma attached to the period without work. So the wage 
penalty varies not only in size but also in causes. 
A period of more than a year’s unemployment in previous years has no effect in any of the 
ten countries. The long-term unemployed do not see a further reduction in wages when they return 
to  work  after  a  long  period  of  unemployment  in  addition  to  the  impact  of  “short-term” 
unemployment under a year. However, these workers already had lower wages when they appeared 
in the panel, to a varying extent by country
11. 
The  method  we  adopted  makes  it  possible  to  examine  the  effects  of  individual-specific 
heterogeneity parameters. Those who on average have already been or will be unemployed for a 
long period already have wages 20% lower in the United Kingdom, Ireland and Germany, and also 
in Belgium and Greece, where the unemployment effect is low. Elsewhere this wage reduction is 
close  to  10%.  Furthermore,  these  long-term  unemployed  were  often  included,  during  their 
unemployment exceeding one year, among the people not selected whose average wages for the 
year  were  unknown,  whether  they  had  dropped  out,  left  the  labour  market  or  were  long-term 
unemployed. Here the positive Mills ratio coefficients
12 that express selection remain smaller than 
this considerable negative effect
13. Negative Mills ratio coefficients in Germany may be due to an 
under-representation of high wages in the panel (Wagner et al., 2006) that appear as non-selected 
persons. 
The wages the unemployed may expect when they return to work is consequently the end 
result  of  this  unemployment  effect  and  structural  effects  (low  qualifications,  tertiary  sector, 
heterogeneity). The latter effects are particularly large in France, Italy, Spain and Greece. In these 
                                                 
11 This effect is noted by the average variable “long period of unemployment in the past” for the whole panel. 
12 The Mills ratio coefficients are positive and indicate that the people selected have on average higher wages than those 
not selected. 
13 Except in France, where the effect is more or less the same.   13
countries, for example, unemployment does not bring a high wage penalty but structural effects 
ensure low potential wages for the unemployed. 
Women are different 
Unlike the results obtained in the United States, unemployment does not have the same 
effect on women in Europe as on men. Women’s wages are far less affected by unemployment. 
Couch and Placzek (2010) suggest that employers probably invest less in specific human capital for 
women because they expect them to have breaks in their careers. Compared with employed women, 
we found that the unemployed lose more in terms of loss of experience than because of any stigma 
attached to unemployment or a loss of specific human capital. Belgium and Germany are exceptions 
here, since there is a specific unemployment effect for women but not for men. 
A period of six months’ unemployment has little effect, varying by country. It is virtually nil 
in Denmark and Italy. It is low in the other southern European countries, except Spain, and in 
France (4%-6%). 
 
Graph  2 The effect of a six months’ period of unemployment on women’s wages 
 
Germany and Belgium are the only countries where there is an unemployment effect for 
women but not for men. The wage penalty in these countries is 10% and 8% respectively. 
Table 3.4 here 
The women hit by long-term unemployment are also the ones whose wages were already 
below average. This is the same as the result found for men. The reduction is more than 20% in the 
United Kingdom and France, and some 15% in Belgium and Italy. Elsewhere it is close to 10%. The 
only exception is Germany, where for women long-term unemployment does not correlate with 
lower  wages.  This  may  be  due  to  the  tax  advantages  that  encourage  women  who  have  been 
unemployed more than a year to turn their position into a career interruption. More than 20% of 
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wages when they return to work (Jürges, 2007).  The heterogeneity coefficients associated with 
long-term  unemployment  are  also  generally  higher  than  those  for  selection  by  employment  or 
attrition
14. 
The role of labour market institutions 
In general, the unemployment penalty is more marked in the English-speaking countries and 
Germany. It is very low in Denmark and low in Greece. Furthermore, unemployment generally 
carries a greater penalty for men than for women. 
But  the  effect  of  unemployment  may  vary  from  one  country  to  another  according  to  wage 
differentials, for example, or any other feature that modifies the workings of the labour market. 
Kuhn (2002),  in one of the  few comparative  analyses of workers made redundant, specifically 
mentions  the  importance  of  labour  market  institutions  to  explain  the  differential  impact  of 
unemployment  on  either  side  of  the  Atlantic.  In  particular,  he  says,  the  organisation  of 
unemployment benefits, the level of the minimum wage and trade union representation are likely to 
modify the wage penalty. 
Ceteris paribus, the level of unemployment benefits may influence re-hire wages. Polachek 
and Xiang (2006) find that more generous benefits exercise an upward pressure on such wages. But 
the allocation of these benefits also depends on eligibility criteria, in particular attempts to find 
work.  Petrongolo  (2009)  shows,  for  example,  that  the  stricter  eligibility  criteria  in  the  British 
unemployment benefit system has increased the rate of coming off benefits but reduced the average 
wage level on re-hire. 
In this way, the United Kingdom, where the unemployment penalty is high, combines a low 
level of benefits and therefore a low replacement rate (Table 3.5) with strict monitoring of attempts 
to  find  work.  At  the  other  extreme,  unemployment  benefits  are  high  in  Denmark  and  the 
unemployment effect is relatively low. In Belgium and Germany, the effects vary by gender. The 
unemployment  effect  is  very  low  for  men  in  Belgium,  who  generally  receive  unemployment 
benefits  indefinitely.  Women,  more  severely  penalised  by  unemployment,  generally  have 
cohabiting status and receive lower benefits that can be suspended if unemployment persists. In 
Germany, a similar mechanism explains more marked effects on women. Unemployment benefits 
are household-income-tested after a certain time and women with a working spouse are no longer 
eligible for them. The Mediterranean countries (Greece, Spain, Italy) and Portugal pay benefits 
below the European average, although little effort is made to monitor job seeking (OECD, 2007). 
                                                 
14 This is not true for Germany and Portugal.   15
Unemployment effects are large for men in Italy and Portugal. For other workers in these southern 
countries, the unemployment effect is slight. 
The effect of unemployment on re-hire wages depends also more generally on the wage 
distribution  (Table  3.5).  Economies  where  wage  differentials  are  wide  are  those  where 
unemployment may considerably penalise wages. This distribution depends on both the level of the 
minimum wage and the strength of employee representative organisations (Kahn, 2010; Koeniger et 
al., 2007). The interdecile ratio in the lower half of the wage distribution (Decile 5/Decile1) is 
relatively low in Belgium and Denmark, where trade union membership and coverage are high and 
the unemployment effect fairly low. The ratio is high in Ireland, Germany and the United Kingdom, 
where the unemployment effect is higher. In Portugal, sector negotiations set minimum wage levels 
that are not binding, and the wages paid are often higher (Blanchard and Jimeno, 1995). The wage 
floors are such that unemployment may reduce the wages paid. 
Unemployment brings less of a stigma with it for women in Europe than in America. Except 
for  Germany,  women’s  wage  differentials,  as  expressed  in  the  Decile5/Decile  1  ratio,  are  also 
narrower  than  men’s  (Table  3.5).  Although  they  usually  receive  lower  wages,  the  level  of  the 
minimum  wage,  acting  as  a  floor,  prevents  the  lowest  wages  from  being  penalised  by 
unemployment. However, women who have been unemployed suffer from their loss of experience, 
particularly in Germany and the United Kingdom. 
Table 3.5 here 
Women’s work is less valued than men’s work in some European countries, which may also 
explain  the  slight  impact  of  unemployment  on  women’s  wages.  In  these  cases,  the  stigma  of 
unemployment may be less. The view that “when jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a 
job than women”
15 is shared by 45% of the population in Greece and 24% in Portugal. Conversely, 
only 3% share this view in Denmark. It may be that the high level of unemployment in southern 
Europe has reduced the stigma attached to it. In an article on the UK economy, Clark (2003) says 
that unemployment undermines the well-being of the unemployed person but that the effect is less 
where the local unemployment rate is high. It may therefore be that unemployment is being de-
dramatised, both for the individual and for the possible future employer. 
                                                 
15 European Social Survey, Round 4, 2008.   16
Conclusion
The consequences of unemployment, whether social, psychological or economic, are clear. 
Unemployment affects the wage potential of those who undergo it, to a varying extent by country 
and gender. Our first finding is that in Europe, too, unemployment can leave a lasting mark on 
people and have wider repercussions than the temporary loss of wages due to losing a job. 
The ten European countries in the panel may be divided into three groups by the situation of 
men and women after six months’ unemployment. In the United Kingdom, Ireland and Germany, 
the impact of unemployment is greatest, with a penalty of some 10%, and 20% for men in the UK. 
Re-hire wages are lower than they would have been without the period of unemployment because in 
those countries experience is valued, wage differentials for men and women are wide in the lower 
half of the wage distribution and, in the UK, low benefits plus strict monitoring of job-seeking force 
the unemployed to accept jobs more quickly, even if it means a major drop in wages. In Germany, 
unemployment is even more penalising for women (–10%) than for men (–7%), since benefits are 
household-income-tested after a year or less of unemployment, which forces women to accept a job 
more quickly. For the same reason, women are more penalised in Belgium (–8%), also indefinite 
generous benefits reduce the wage penalty for men. Men in Belgium belong, therefore, in the group 
of countries (Denmark and Greece) where the wage penalty is slight, less than 5% for men and 
women alike. In Denmark (–1%) in particular, generous unemployment benefits make it possible to 
wait for a job with no loss of wages other than for experience, which is at all events little valued. 
The other countries form the group where the wage penalty is medium, comprising Spain on the one 
hand and France, Italy and Portugal on the other, where the penalty is less than 5% for women and 
close to 10% for men. 
It is also crucial to take account of heterogeneity in many European countries. Those who 
suffer unemployment, especially long-term unemployment, have different characteristics from other 
people, which further reduces their wage-earning potential. The wages they accept are a function of 
their observed and unobserved characteristics and the actual unemployment effect. The end result of 
these various elements may considerably reduce their wages and be the source of inequality and 
poverty. This also raises the question of incentives to find a new job since the wages to be expected 
on the market may be low compared to the unemployment benefits received. 
The wage penalty is greater for men than for women. It is also higher in the more flexible 
economies. We have put forward an explanation in terms of labour market institutions, particularly 
those that influence wage differentials and pressure to find a job. Countries where there is strong 
pressure to find a job and wage differentials are wide are also those where unemployment leaves 
more of a mark when a job is found.   17
Various extensions of this research might be considered, such as closer examination of the 
role of institutions and restructuring in the labour market. It would also be instructive to modulate 
our  findings  by  type  of  employment  contract  for  workers  before  and  after  a  period  of 
unemployment. 
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TABLES 
Table 1.1. Characteristics of those who have experienced unemployment in 1995 








during all year 
Belgium  27.2%  72.8% 14.3% 74.1% 11.6% 60.9% 
Denmark  35.6%  64.4% 14.4% 73.7% 11.9% 23.7% 
France  48.2%  51.8% 25.9% 66.5% 7.6% 26.1% 
Germany  45.9%  54.1% 13.2% 65.7% 21.1% 26.6% 
Greece  38.9%  61.1% 28.0% 67.0% 5.0% 46.5% 
Ireland  72.4%  27.6% 22.8% 70.3% 6.9% 55.0% 
Italy  53.9%  46.1% 37.7% 59.1% 3.2% 62.7% 
Portugal  45.3%  54.7% 26.7% 61.6% 11.6% 36.7% 
Spain  55.1%  44.9% 24.3% 68.5% 7.2% 44.5% 
United-
Kingdom  63.1%  36.9%  27.7%  60.0%  12.4%  20.8% 
UE-10  50.7%  49.3% 25.4% 65.9% 8.7% 42.4% 
Source : ECHP, Base : individuals having a period of unemployment in 1995. 
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Table 3.1 Male Wage Equations  
  Nordic and Continental countries  Anglo-saxon countries  Mediterranean countries 
Explanatory variables  Belgium  Denmark  France  Germany  United-
Kingdom  Ireland  Greece  Italy  Portugal  Spain 
                 
  Constant  10,0382***  8,51429***  7,97236***  6,48860***  5,62007***  5,59324***  11,2424***  7,23508***  11,1291***  11,1653*** 
                     
  Lower education  -0,1731***  -0,14175*** -0,13726***  -0,22150***  -0,11425***  -0,17454***  -0,2557***  -0,23154*** -0,4195***  -0,1804*** 
  Higher education  0,2977***  0,21933***  0,51805***  0,30550***  0,19734***  0,27331***  0,2846***  0,37358***  0,6171***  0,3222*** 
  Experience  0,0225***  0,02787***  0,01015***  0,04984***  0,05590***  0,03009***  0,0062  0,01232***  0,0279***  0,0022 
  Experience-squarred  -0,0003***  -0,00030*** -0,00007***  -0,00032***  -0,00038***  -0,00029***  -0,0001***  -0,00008**  -0,0002***  -0,0000 
  Part-Time  -0,1310*    -0,23122*** -0,22324***  -0,15581***  -0,26148***  -0,24620***  -0,0344  -0,19504*** -0,1732*  -0,1389*** 
                     
  Public Sector  0,0241  -0,11277*** -0,05192***  0,05701***  -0,06762***  -0,06929***  0,0199  0,05926***  0,0707***  0,0012 
  Agriculture  -0,5712***  -0,37293*** -0,37532***  -0,43764***  -0,43517***  -0,49692***  -0,4533***  -0,45206*** -1,0278***  -0,3691*** 
  Industry  0,0250  -0,03313*** 0,03257***  0,03451***  0,03826***  0,07914***  0,0210*  0,05156***  -0,0251*  0,0936*** 
                     
  Duration of latest unemployment period  -0,0168  0,01561  -0,05889***  -0,02092  -0,13957***  -0,06036***  -0,0428*  -0,08723*** -0,0824***  -0,0381*** 
  Number of Unemployment periods  -0,0154  -0,02542**  0,02927***  0,01882  -0,03062  0,01052  -0,0023  0,05515***  -0,0094  0,0060 
 Dummy 1995  0,0802  0,16984*  0,06688  -0,05163  0,00927  0,12708***  0,1370***  0,15236***  -0,0555  0,0519 
Dummy 1996  0,1635**  0,18697**  0,08598*  0,04333  0,19852***  0,20935***  0,1905***  0,19081***  -0,0556  0,0623 
Dummy 1997  0,1757***  0,29092***  0,07046  0,00243  0,15588**  0,26436***  0,3069***  0,25563***  -0,0623  0,1778*** 
Dummy 1998  0,3675***  0,18434*  0,08950*  -0,05822  0,09911  0,29282***  0,3846***  0,37861***  -0,0327  0,2744*** 
Dummy 1999  0,3320***  0,35484***  0,17556***  0,03996  0,09783  0,26640***  0,4028***  0,31397***  0,0864  0,4820*** 
Dummy 2000  0,3543***  0,38793***  0,19417***  -0,07207  0,11585  0,34180***  0,4775***  0,33290***  -0,0946  0,5878*** 
  Mills Ratio 1994  -0,0249  0,03772  0,14526***  -0,02915  0,08802***  0,14532***  0,1096***  0,15283***  -0,0028  0,1407*** 
  Mills Ratio 1995  -0,0492**  -0,02093  0,12030***  -0,01800  0,07877***  0,09388***  0,0893***  0,10499***  0,0344  0,1463*** 
  Mills Ratio 1996  -0,0719***  -0,00913  0,11987***  -0,06911***  0,01295  0,08827***  0,1215***  0,08466***  0,0553**  0,1424*** 
  Mills Ratio 1997  -0,0484  -0,03318*  0,13845***  -0,06058***  0,03966*  0,09473***  0,1107***  0,08620***  0,0668*  0,1355*** 
  Mills Ratio 1998  -0,1249***  0,02022  0,13933***  -0,05253**  0,03145  0,10898***  0,1130***  0,05131***  0,0669*  0,1077*** 
  Mills Ratio 1999  -0,0787***  -0,03790**  0,13848***  -0,09373***  0,04045  0,15136***  0,1327***  0,09341***  0,0063  0,0367** 
  Mills Ratio 2000  -0,0575*  -0,03434  0,14265***  -0,04016*  0,05763**  0,16256***  0,1316***  0,10315***  0,1196***  0,0077 
  Cohorte (age in 1993)  0,0197**  0,02293***  0,02168***  0,07641***  0,04906***  0,03112***  0,0231***  -0,01678*** 0,0267***  0,0025 
  Cohorte (age in 1993 squarred)  -0,0000  -0,00011  -0,00004  -0,00075***  -0,00053***  -0,00025***  -0,0002***  0,00021***  -0,0003***  0,0001 
  Mean Experience  -0,0064  -0,01793*** -0,00595***  -0,04818***  -0,04633***  -0,01861***  0,0041  0,00242  -0,0128***  0,0072** 
  Mean Experience squarred  0,0001*  0,00016***  0,00002  0,00025***  0,00025***  0,00017***  0,0000  -0,00004  0,0000  -0,0000 
  Mean Part-Time  -0,5091***  -0,56615*** -0,75696***  -0,83242***  -0,67767***  -0,51950***  -1,0817***  -1,27274*** -0,8381***  -0,8671*** 
  Mean number of children  0,0268***  0,03098***  0,03108***  0,06226***  0,03822***  0,06806***  0,0260***  0,02944***  -0,0089  0,0275*** 
  Mean Duration of Unemployment  -0,0986*  -0,10426*** -0,13313***  -0,08829**  -0,10907**  -0,02063  -0,0610*  -0,10556*** 0,0513  -0,1020*** 
  Mean Number of Unemployment periods  0,0099  0,02471  -0,06711***  -0,13324***  -0,01486  -0,03550  0,0216  -0,02509  -0,0624**  0,0062 
  Mean Long-term Unemployment 
 
-0,2100***  -0,08211*** 0,10975***  -0,17898***  0,25298***  -0,20796***  -0,1978***  -0,14167*** -0,0895***  -0,1207*** 
  R-squarred  0,26  0,30  0,45  0,45  0,32  0,45  0,38  0,25  0,41  0,36 
  Number of observations  9 246  8 678  20 250  23 494  15 270  12 047  17 495  26 419  19 255  22 074   22
Table 3.2. Female Wage Equations 
  Nordic and Continental countries  Anglo-saxon countries  Mediterranean countries 
Explanatory variables   Belgium  Denmark  France  Germany  United-
Kingdom  Ireland  Greece  Italy  Portugal  Spain 
                  
                     
  Constant  9,69185***  8,24830***  7,78659***  6,48625***  6,34442***  6,33141***  11,0852***  7,11790***  11,0258***  10,8478*** 
                     
  Lower education  -0,11049*** -0,11118*** -0,20587***  -0,10819***  -0,19399***  -0,19973***  -0,2804***  -0,24261*** -0,4950***  -0,2350*** 
  Higher education  0,19376***  0,09901***  0,30909***  0,17627***  0,13685***  0,28893***  0,1775***  0,13209***  0,4593***  0,2614*** 
  Experience  0,00650  0,00855  0,00345*  0,05039***  0,06535***  0,03802***  0,0346***  0,01784***  0,0208***  0,0232*** 
  Experience-squarred  -0,00002  -0,00015*** -0,00002  -0,00019***  -0,00025***  -0,00024***  -0,0002***  -0,00008*  -0,0000  -0,0002*** 
  Part-Time  -0,17202*** -0,17012*** -0,20683***  -0,25775***  -0,45851***  -0,34354***  -0,1184***  -0,14012*** -0,2422***  -0,1594*** 
                     
  Public Sector  0,12461***  -0,01171  0,12126***  0,16936***  0,10191***  0,09820***  0,1333***  0,18679***  0,1433***  0,1412*** 
  Agriculture  -0,56820  -0,50808*** -0,39972***  -0,25739***  -0,54315***  -0,28319***  -1,1897***  -1,37083*** -1,1379***  -0,8357*** 
  Industry  0,05200**  0,03390*  0,19852***  0,19829***  0,13451***  0,17568***  0,1096***  0,17159***  0,0992***  0,1614*** 
                     
 Duration of latest unemployment period  -0,06902**  0,01696  -0,03831**  -0,04803**  -0,00751  -0,04207**  -0,0179  -0,00477  -0,0321  -0,0427*** 
  Number of Unemployment periods  -0,01806  -0,01691  0,02882***  0,12161***  -0,02367  0,02140  -0,0217**  0,04578***  0,0028  0,0091 
Dummy 1995  -0,00565  0,08683  0,00634  -0,07177  -0,17531***  0,05234  0,1037**  0,05864  0,0857  0,1114*** 
Dummy 1996  0,03507  0,14045**  0,01470  -0,16870**  -0,20326***  0,02234  0,1870***  0,09405**  0,0649  0,1069** 
Dummy 1997  0,02530  0,23235***  0,02670  -0,20729***  -0,23019***  0,05751  0,2854***  0,17603***  0,1507**  0,1705*** 
Dummy 1998  0,08979  0,21892***  0,05652  -0,17615**  -0,31250***  0,11571**  0,3454***  0,18827***  0,1788**  0,2068*** 
Dummy 1999  0,06650  0,31297***  0,08234**  -0,24119***  -0,32558***  0,20221***  0,3292***  0,18158***  0,0896  0,2717*** 
Dummy 2000  0,17510*  0,37090***  0,10164**  -0,42645***  -0,29375***  0,33575***  0,3615***  0,20835***  0,1562*  0,2667*** 
  Mills Ratio 1994  0,01639  0,05697**  0,08936***  0,08369**  0,09033***  0,16372***  0,1503***  0,11710***  0,2091***  0,1556*** 
  Mills Ratio 1995  0,02746  0,04284  0,07581***  0,08181***  0,11702***  0,11593***  0,1037***  0,07753***  0,1736***  0,1028*** 
  Mills Ratio 1996  0,02585  0,04018*  0,08142***  0,13166***  0,11818***  0,12397***  0,1032***  0,06904***  0,2005***  0,1171*** 
  Mills Ratio 1997  0,03682  0,02627  0,09681***  0,14219***  0,11742***  0,13412***  0,1087***  0,04294***  0,1684***  0,1230*** 
  Mills Ratio 1998  0,01593  0,06133**  0,08958***  0,10447***  0,10293***  0,09788***  0,0826***  0,04684**  0,1463***  0,1084*** 
  Mills Ratio 1999  0,07198**  0,04350  0,10973***  0,14611***  0,11474***  0,10978***  0,0893***  0,05542***  0,1795***  0,1386*** 
  Mills Ratio 2000  0,02382  0,03271  0,11901***  0,24894***  0,13156***  0,09251***  0,0819***  0,05572**  0,1809***  0,1353*** 
  Cohorte (age in 1993)  0,05174***  0,03368***  0,04042***  0,05394***  0,01361**  -0,02475***  0,0303***  -0,00684  -0,0084*  0,0167*** 
  Cohorte (age in 1993 squarred)  -0,00069  -0,00040*** -0,00038***  -0,00055***  -0,00017*  0,00041***  -0,0005***  0,00007  0,0002**  -0,0002*** 
  Mean Experience  -0,00748  -0,00539  -0,00294  -0,04356***  -0,05703***  -0,02292***  -0,0183***  -0,00677  0,0002  -0,0103* 
  Mean Experience squarred  0,00004  0,00013**  -0,00001  0,00010**  0,00013***  0,00008  0,0000  -0,00003  -0,0002***  0,0001 
  Mean Part-Time  -0,40072*** -0,38894*** -0,58655***  -0,68806***  -1,06931***  -0,39409***  -0,7903***  -0,57365*** -0,6546***  -0,6011*** 
  Mean number of children  -0,01758*  0,02494***  -0,01295*  -0,08047***  -0,14844***  -0,00312  0,0073  -0,02251**  -0,0465***  0,0052 
  Mean Duration of Unemployment  -0,07976**  -0,05637*  -0,07199***  -0,02227  -0,06523  0,01020  -0,0383  -0,13394*** -0,0511  -0,0173 
  Mean Number of Unemployment Periods  -0,01397  0,01681  -0,06614***  -0,18582***  -0,05497*  -0,05879**  0,0856***  -0,01045  0,0408  -0,0001 
  Mean Long-term Unemployment  -0,16245*** -0,12040*** -0,22192***  -0,01989  -0,22953***  -0,06450**  -0,1100***  -0,14898*** -0,0807***  -0,1174*** 
                     
  R-squarred  0,23  0,26  0,41  0,35  0,39  0,46  0,40  0,25  0,49  0,38 
  Number of observations  7 624  8 012  16 975  18 811  15 693  6 998  8 361  15 201  13 488  11 666   23
Table 3.3 Sources of wage penalty for men 
Specific effect of  
past unemployment   Low penalty  Medium penalty High penalty 
No  Denmark (1%)
Belgium (3%)  Germany (7%)   









Table 3.4 Sources of wage penalty for women 
Specific effect of  




Portugal (5%)  
Greece (5%) 
United-Kingdom (7%) 

















/decile1  decile5 /decile1 
Belgium  1,38 39% 1,36
Denmark  1,51 58% 1,45
France  1,57 38% 1,54
Germany  1,88 27% 1,98
Greece  1,72 15% 1,66
Ireland  1,92 29% 1,74
Italy  1,65 25% 1,62
Portugal  1,64 38% 1,51
Spain  1,69 29% 1,65
United-
Kingdom  1,82  18%  1,70 
Source : OECD, 2001 figures for decile ratios of gross earnings- 
2004 figures for Greece and Italy- 2003 figures for Ireland. Gross 





Countries  Persons with a complete 
calendar of activity 
 (%) 
Belgium  90,7% 
Denmark  87,1% 
France  82,4% 
Germany  77,7% 
Greece  89,0% 
Ireland  96,9% 
Italy  92,0% 
Spain  87,7% 
Portugal  91,3% 
United-Kingdom 94,0% 
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